Peter Bayer
@tse-fr.eu
Toulouse School of Economics
Scopus Publications
Scholar Citations
Scholar h-index
Scholar i10-index
Scopus Publications
Péter Bayer and Jeffrey West
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Péter Bayer, György Kozics, and Nóra Gabriella Szőke
Elsevier BV
Péter Bayer, Joel S. Brown, Johan Dubbeldam, and Mark Broom
Elsevier BV
Péter Bayer, Robert A. Gatenby, Patricia H. McDonald, Derek R. Duckett, Kateřina Staňková, and Joel S. Brown
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
We propose a model of cancer initiation and progression where tumor growth is modulated by an evolutionary coordination game. Evolutionary games of cancer are widely used to model frequency-dependent cell interactions with the most studied games being the Prisoner’s Dilemma and public goods games. Coordination games, by their more obscure and less evocative nature, are left understudied, despite the fact that, as we argue, they offer great potential in understanding and treating cancer. In this paper we present the conditions under which coordination games between cancer cells evolve, we propose aspects of cancer that can be modeled as results of coordination games, and explore the ways through which coordination games of cancer can be exploited for therapy.
Péter Bayer, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, and Ronald Peeters
Elsevier BV
Péter Bayer, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ronald Peeters, and Frank Thuijsman
Elsevier BV
Péter Bayer, Joel S. Brown, and Kateřina Staňková
Elsevier BV