Cyber Physical Systems Security: Bridging Privacy, Verification, Intelligence, and Forensics Ramya K, Sutirth Rath, P. B. Venkataraman, Ratnesh Kumar IEEE Access, 2026 Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) now underpin critical sectors including energy, healthcare, transportation, and industrial automation, yet their tight coupling of computational intelligence with physical processes exposes them to sophisticated, multi-layer attacks. This survey provides a unified, end-to-end examination of CPS security by consolidating advances in privacy-preserving computation, hardware-rooted trust, intelligent intrusion detection, formal assurance, and digital forensics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first survey to holistically interconnect these pillars within a comprehensive CPS security framework. The review introduces a structured taxonomy linking CPS security attributes to system assets, attack vectors, and defence strategies, and surveys publicly available CPS datasets, benchmarking environments, and experimental testbeds that support reproducible evaluation. It traces the evolution of differential privacy for data protection, physically unclonable functions for device identity, blockchain for integrity and provenance, AI/ML for adaptive threat detection, and formal verification for correctness and safety, while highlighting the emerging role of forensic readiness. Despite notable progress, CPS security faces persistent challenges in scalability, adversarial robustness, real-time deployment, interoperability, and benchmarking. To address these gaps, the article outlines a research roadmap emphasizing hybrid defence architectures, standardized datasets and testbeds, benchmarking standards, and adaptive governance models for resilient CPS ecosystems.
The Interplay between Neutrality, Qualified Neutrality and Co-belligerency in the Context of U.S. Intervention in the Russia-Ukraine War Kritika Ramya International and Comparative Law Review, 2023 Summary The United States of America (U.S.), and the European Union (EU) have supplied weapons to Ukraine in the ongoing Russian-Ukraine armed conflict. The Pentagon has pledged thousands of weapons to Ukraine as part of the security/military aid to worn-torn Ukraine. The supply of such weapons by a neutral/non- belligerent state stands in clear violation of the laws of Neutrality which casts a duty on the neutral states to refrain from participating in the hostilities and be impartial in their conduct towards the belligerents. However, the argument of the U.S. government in previous such instances has been that laws of neutrality have been overshadowed by the United Nations (UN) Charter and modern forms of warfare and the U.S. maintains that they fall under qualified neutrality after the 20th century. However, Qualified Neutrality is not recognised either under treaty conventions or customary international law. Similarly, international laws in terms of co-belligerency are also governed by International Humanitarian Laws (IHL) under the Four Geneva Convention of 1949 which lays down rules where military assistance by a neutral state can result in co-belligerency. However, no existing treaty or international law lays down a clear threshold for crossing from a neutral state to a co-belligerent state which has also led to an ambiguity in terms of checks and balances of the lethal weapons supplied to Ukraine by the U.S. currently. This article attempts to define the threshold in terms of severity, effectiveness, and inertia of the intervention. It further argues that the U.S. has crossed its threshold and therefore the existing laws governing violation of neutrality and affixing of state responsibility are now applicable to the U.S.
